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A United Failure: The Failure of the United Nations, United States, and Global Community
in Preventing and Responding to the 1994 Rwandan Genocide

The Rwandan Genocide that lasted from April 6, 1994 until mid-July of that same year
represents a unique and utter failure of the global community to end genocidal violence in a nation
ripping itself apart. Compared to previous genocides like the Holocaust or Armenian cases, images
and information began pouring out of the nation immediately following its beginning. Pictures,
letters, and other firsthand accounts illustrated a grave need that the global community needed to
intervene. Moreover, the warning signs had existed in the years prior to the genocide that Rwanda
was a nation ripe for an explosion of ethnic violence. Although hierarchical tensions had existed
between the Hutu and Tutsi prior to German (and later Belgian) colonization, it was greatly
exacerbated by colonial powers and later an extremist government that sought to alienate the Tutsi
from Rwandan life. The United Nations, who had a force on the ground in Rwanda starting in
1993, failed to act, and would even reduce the number of UN peacekeepers in Rwanda as the
genocide progressed. The United States, who had been so involved with the Somali Civil War
seven months prior, indifferently watched the slaughter from a distance, claiming that the human
(that is, American soldier) and monetary costs were too severe to justify any intervention. The
global community, which had been so resolved in its commitment to “never again” sat largely
inactive, watching a small African nation consume itself in destruction. This paper does not seek
to pose possible means of intervention, but solely to offer a critique of the global community in
their failure to save hundreds of thousands of innocent lives. The utter failure of the United Nations
and larger global community to do anything about the genocide is one of the greatest humanitarian
failures of the twentieth century, and maybe even human history. The issue in Rwanda was not a
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lack of capacity to intervene, it was an issue of indifference. “Peux ce que veux. Allons-y”1-Where
there’s a will, there’s a way. Let’s go.
An important clarification to be made in any work done on genocide is what is considered
genocide by the global community. Following the Holocaust, the United Nations set out to come
up with a word and definition of what genocide is in order to prevent it in the future. Prior to
Raphael Lemkin’s work in the 1940s, genocide was not even a word in the vocabulary of the global
community. The 1948 Genocide Convention was ratified by over 40 nations prior to its
implementation in 1951, including nations like the United States, France, and Belgium.2 According
to the UN Convention, genocide is legally defined as:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such:
a. Killing members of the group
b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part
d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group
e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group3
Furthermore, the convention also acted as an obligatory contract of the signing nations.
Article I of the convention states that genocide is: “...a crime under international law which they
[the signing nations] undertake to prevent and punish.”4 This article creates an obligation and
responsibility of the signing nations to intervene when they agree that genocide is occurring in any
nation across the world. This convention creates an interesting scenario. Given the requirements
to label something as a genocide without deeper investigation, the UN danced around labeling the
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Rwandan Genocide as a genocide. According to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the Tutsi-led
group had labeled the events as genocide as early as April 13th, with an estimated death toll of
20,000 after the first week.5 It is understandable that the United Nations would not want to hastily
declare genocide in any case, so as to avoid interventions in what are essentially civil wars or
risking bad press. However, the accounts flowing in from certifiable sources on the ground in
Rwanda should have been enough to justify some sort of action. In many documents, however, the
events in Rwanda are typified as “genocidal acts may have occurred¨6 or that there is “evidence of
possible acts of genocide”7 without calling it genocide outright. Because the UN specifically used
this exact language, it deferred any legal obligation to actively intervene in Rwanda.

Effects of the Western Colonial Period of Rwanda
Any in-depth analysis of Rwanda requires a discussion of the long-term colonial causes as
well. The contorted colonial history of Rwanda has had repercussions that have lasted through the
generations, and the periods of colonial rule under the Germans and Belgians had deadly
consequences for the Rwandan people. The nature of the Hutu-Tutsi relationship prior to German
colonization in the late nineteenth century is oft-debated in the scholarly world; while some believe
there was a level of “symbiosis” between the groups, others argue that the oligarchical rule of the
Tutsi cattle herders was oppressive and aimed and subjecting the Hutu majority to their rule. 8
Regardless of the nature of their relationship, the Hutu majority came in time to despise the rule
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of the Tutsi minority. Each of these views hold some merit, but the scholarly consensus is that the
Hutu and Tutsi of Rwanda did not fit the European norm of “tribal violence” on the African
continent.9 This disparity in power largely stems from certain genetic differences that existed
between the Tutsi and Hutu, but later became exacerbated by the Germans and the Belgians.
Naturally speaking, the Tutsi living within Rwanda upon German arrival (whose genetic pool was
significantly “purer” as intermarriage between the two groups was somewhat uncommon) were
taller, around twelve centimeters according to the earliest German studies.10 This physical
advantage coupled with the status of many Tutsi as cattle herders led to a European embrace of
the existing societal structures in place upon arrival. Thus, the Tutsi leaders in positions of power
became natural allies of the Germans, who favored the Tutsi minority. Naturally, the Germans’
interest quickly shifted into discovering the origins of the Tutsi, as they clearly were a different
group from the Hutu. Several hypotheses were developed by German scientists and other
Europeans as well, but the most popular is the migration hypothesis. This hypothesis was originally
based solely on the height of Rwanda’s Hutu inhabitants, but in later years it has come to be defined
by more genetically-based research. Two common genetic differences provide a fairly accurate
divide between the Hutu and Tutsi: the existence of the sickle cell trait and the capacity to digest
lactose. Both the sickle-cell trait and inability to digest lactose is incredibly common among both
the Hutu of Rwanda, but also the Hutu of neighboring countries like Burundi and the (now)
Democratic Republic of the Congo.11 Thus, it is observable to identify European fabrication and
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agitation of Rwandan ethnic tensions all the way back in the late nineteenth century in Rwanda
that would eventually manifest itself in the 1994 genocide.
Another reason for the German (and later Belgian) favor of the Tutsi stems from the
Hamitic hypothesis. In the view of some of the colonizers, the Tutsi were more adjacent to
European blood than the Hutu and Twa, and had been destined to rule the inferior Hutu from the
start.12 But how could the Tutsi be more adjacent to European blood than the Hutu? There is more
at play in this instance than the mere difference in height. Some of the early German colonizers,
in an attempt to consolidate their alliance with the Tutsi leaders and justify colonization, created
the theory that the Tutsi people were actually the lost tribe of Ham from the Bible.13 The lost tribe
of Ham is the legendary offspring of one of Noah’s sons, who had gazed upon his father’s
nakedness and thus had Ham’s descendants punished by the legendary patriarch. This Biblical
hypothesis greatly skewed the German perspective of Rwanda’s demographics towards the
minority. According to Belgian political scientist Peter Uvin, “The distinctions between Hutu and
Tutsi…are invested with notions of moral and human superiority and inferiority”: the notion that
the Tutsi residing in the Great Lakes region had some direct Biblical tie (and thus superiority)
garnered much traction among German leaders of the time.14 This view is inherently problematic,
as the Germans' view and treatment of the Hutu and Tutsi was encumbered by their own racist
ideology. The entire idea of European colonization was predicated on the fact of European
superiority, leading colonial Europeans to themselves construct hierarchies in the new lands they
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found themselves ruling.15 The continued European preference to the Tutsi minority created a
strong level of animosity among many Hutu, as they felt the treatment they were receiving was
unfair. By using falsehoods to uphold existing social structures, colonial powers planted the seeds
of distrust that would later be realized during the genocide.
The most marked and extreme step taken by the Belgian colonial administration (which
gained control of Rwanda in 1919 thanks to the Treaty of Versailles) when it came to creating
tension along the Hutu/Tutsi divide was their introduction of ID cards. In an attempt to affirm their
authority as well as the existing hierarchy in Rwanda, the Belgian administration issued ID cards
beginning in the 1930s to all Rwandans, dividing them among the distinct groups of Hutu, Tutsi,
and Twa.16 This moment in Belgian colonial rule stripped away every Rwandan of his or her
unique combination of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa genetics and heritage and assigned them one, specific
group. It is estimated by some authors that intermarriage of the three ethnic groups in Rwanda had
been occurring for “hundreds of years”, thus blurring the genetic lines between Hutu and Tutsi (a
point still debated among scholars). This practice of casting Rwandans as either Hutu or Tutsi,
rather than some kind of combination, also outlasted the Belgians in Rwanda. The practice of a
paper identifying the ethnic identity of Rwandans was common practice of the Rwandan
government all the way up until the genocide, and greatly aided in the swift efficiency which
marked it.17 Additionally, the Belgian attempts to consolidate complex ethnic identities into black
and white impacted areas such as administration and education. Certain administrative roles were
exclusively limited to those classified as Tutsi, and curriculum in Rwanda’s schools began to
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reflect European-created ideas of racial roots.18 This seemingly simple decision by Belgium’s
colonial leaders had effects that trickled down all the way to 1994.
As the 1950s began, Belgium became a much less willing administrator in Rwanda. As a
result of shifting Belgian attitudes following the end of World War II and increased anti-colonial
sentiment across the globe, Hutu movements calling for an end to Tutsi dominion in Rwanda
gained traction. This shift paired with the increasing passivity of the colonial administration
spurred on these cries.19 The Belgian government had clung so closely to the dichotomy amplified
by the Germans that they were less than prepared for a rapid shift in the ethnic power dynamic of
Rwanda itself. Perhaps the Belgians were growing wary of increased anti-colonial sentiment
among the Tutsi elite; regardless, a weakening in Belgium’s colonial grip greatly destabilized
Rwandan society throughout the 1950s.20 1959 saw the beginning of the Hutu Revolution
(sometimes referred to as the “Social” Revolution) and almost the complete collapse of Rwanda’s
society. The only Hutu subchief was attacked in November and reports that he died encouraged a
frenzy of ethnic violence aimed towards Tutsi.21 Granted, the Revolution was not completely
violent. The transition of power into the hands of a Hutu elite, (which essentially received the
Belgian blessing) was peaceful to an extent, and author Mahmood Mamdani argues the rest of the
aims of the Revolution could have also been accomplished more or less peacefully (at least in
comparison to other periods in Rwanda’s history).22 This reversal of Rwanda’s social hierarchy
also had a wide impact across every level of society. Another unfortunate byproduct of the
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Revolution saw quotas implemented that put strict limits on the number of Tutsi that would be
allowed to serve in the civil government, go to school, and essentially cast the Tutsi into a position
of invisibility within Rwanda.23 By casting the Tutsi out of Rwandan life as a whole, Hutu
extremists continued to ferment the seeds of anti-Tutsi rhetoric and push the divide between Hutu
and Tutsi. Rwanda gained full independence after 3 years of the Revolution in 1962, with Gregoire
Kayibanda taking charge of a provisional government.24 By 1962, the about-face of Rwandan
society was now complete. And although Rwanda would see marked improvements in terms of
economic output and standard of living in the ensuing decades, the period of Hutu rule would not
be peaceful.

Widespread Ethnic Violence Returns: The Rwandan Civil War, 1990-1993
While Rwanda may have been more or less at peace at certain periods following the end of
the 1959 Revolution, it was again thrown into a hurricane of ethnic warfare in 1990. In October of
that year, an army of Tutsi refugees forming the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) and the RPF
began an invasion from neighboring Uganda.25 This invasion was a complex, political movement
that involved leaders from several different nations. For example, much of the RPA also served
under Yoweri Museveni, who at that time was in power in Uganda following his triumph in its
bloody Civil War; Museveni, as well as many of his key advisors, viewed the Tutsi living within
Uganda’s borders as “troublesome”, and did not mind seeing them aggressively return to their
homeland.26 Furthermore, the recommencement of hostilities in 1990 came at a time where
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President Juvenal Habyarimana’s (who had taken power from Kayibanda in a 1970s coup)
government was somewhat beginning to lose its grip on power in Rwanda. As a result of both a
devastating famine and a devaluation of Rwanda’s currency by the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund, the lives of everyday Rwandans worsened and their attitude towards the
Habyarimana government soured.27 The invasion of an ethnic minority gave Habyarimana a
pristine opportunity to consolidate his power by defeating the invaders. Rwanda’s Civil War also
gave the world a preview of what was to come. The Habyarimana regime used the invasion as a
“pretext and a cover-up” for the murder of Tutsi in Rwanda under the auspices of defensive
purposes.28 As a result of the RPF invasion, the Hutu extremists in the government had a number
of small-scale dry runs of exterminating the Tutsi. Not only was this a rehearsal in terms of carrying
out the genocide, it was also a way to gauge the response from global powers. When their
massacres during the Civil War went unmentioned during peace negotiations, extremists in the
Rwandan government acknowledged this indifference and began preparing for larger killings in
the future.29 They no longer needed to fear of foreign intervention once their plan was put into
motion: all that was needed was a spark.
The larger effects of the RPF/RPA invasion can also not be understated when it comes to
studying the genocide in the coming years. By linking the Tutsi-fueled invasion to both the
economic crises faced in Rwanda as well as the threat of a return to Tutsi rule, Habyarimana and
his government began to push radical ideologies in the hardest hit, rural areas of Rwanda. 30 This
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view would continue to be promulgated from the initial stages of the Civil War up through the
genocide. Images began to circulate in both private and state-owned media organizations that
depicted the Tutsi as barbarous. One example of this propaganda depicts RPF soldiers brutally
murdering a baby, before offering to share the meat of the now dead child with its parents with the
caption: “The RPF democracy in full function: equal shares for all.”31 Another view that grew in
terms of support was that the Hutu were the true Rwandans and that the invading Tutsi were foreign
invaders planning on destroying Rwanda.32 It was also during this period that historians agree the
first substantial seeds of genocidal thought were being planted in the minds of powerful Hutu.
Many Hutu chauvinists used the invasion as a pretense to begin planning to exterminate the Tutsi
in 1991-92; after all, the Tutsi could now be displayed as an opposing force to the Hutu of Rwanda
as they waged a bloody civil war from Uganda.33 At this moment, we can see the evolution from
a disdain for the Tutsi to a tangible hatred.
The bloody Civil War, with a few ceasefires here and there, would continue for nearly 3
years after the RPF invasion of 1990. In 1992, the RPF and Hutu Rwandan government sat down
to discuss the terms of a more final end to the conflict. These negotiations would take place in
Arusha, Tanzania, and granted many concessions to the Tutsi and the RPF.34 The chief aim of the
Arusha talks was to not only find a way to end the bloody conflict, but also to determine a path of
conciliation between the Hutu and formerly displaced Tutsi. It also aimed to create a Rwandan
government where Hutu and Tutsi had equitable control of the government and its day-to-day
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running. Both the Hutu-dominated Mouvement revolutionnaire national pour le dveloppement et
la Dimocratie (MRNDD) and the RPF would have an equal number of cabinet positions, with
other, smaller political groups each earning a handful.35 Furthermore, the United States chose to
insert itself as a broker in the peace talks, joining Tanzania and other African nations to help settle
the conflict. Joining the United States, other nations (largely foreign financial supporters of
Rwanda) like Belgium and France coerced Habyarimana into these peace talks with the invading
RPF.36 During this period of peace talks, Habyarimana faced stiff opposition from Hutu extremists
within his cabinet. Throughout the effort to create peace in Rwanda, these extremists put up stiffer
opposition to proposals made at Arusha, thus further radicalizing the group of people that would
call for the genocide’s start in April 1994.37 Eventually, despite facing harsh opposition from
radical Hutu, the Arusha Accords were signed. Following the signing of the accords, the world
collectively breathed a sigh of relief, as they believed that Rwanda’s future had been determined
by internationally-mandated peace. Unfortunately, the process and signing of the peace at Arusha
arguably condemned Rwanda to an even darker, deadlier explosion of inevitable ethnic violence.
A problem that emerged from the intense racialization of the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups
is how it was (and to some extent still is today) reported by media and scholarly sources. As
previously mentioned, Hutu and Tutsi are not actual racial classifications, but rather ethnic and
based on the history of ancestors. A fairly common mistake during the 1990s was to refer to the
two groups as “tribes.” Following the RPF invasion in 1990, media around the world classified the
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renewed civil war as a tribe. Just a few days into the invasion, the New York Times referred to the
invading force as: “A refugee army of more than 1,000 fighters belonging to the Tutsi tribe”.38
Even the headline of that article poses problems. It labels the RPF as “invaders” of Rwanda, rather
than acknowledging that the “invading” Tutsi were actual Rwandans merely displaced by ethnic
persecution. On the surface, this may seem like merely a pedantic error, but this view turned out
to be exceedingly important in the world’s impression of the coming genocide. First, by viewing
the tensions between the Hutu and Tutsi as “tribal”, the mixing of Hutu and Tutsi through
reproduction was essentially ignored. It created a dichotomy that merely allowed for Hutu or Tutsi
to exist, but those with mixed histories suffered due to the removal of “intermediate” groups.39
Second, it portrayed both the Hutu and Tutsi as sub-human. Historically, “other” groups have often
been cast as being under (whether socially, economically, etc.) whoever classified them as such.
In the Rwandan context, it created an apathy towards the historically warring tribes of Rwanda
and led many to leave the genocide alone.

From an Uncertain Peace to Genocide (left off with editing here-page 12)
Furthermore, what the world knew prior to the genocide should have set off alarm bells
that an atrocity was brewing in the Great Lakes region. Through his efforts in negotiating the peace
at Arusha, as well as a period of time of bringing Rwanda into a more modern age, President
Habyarimana was viewed as a starling by many in the global community and especially in
France.40 Prior to the genocide, Habyarimana and his regime were able to alter the outside
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perception of what was truly going on in Rwanda; instead of seeing a ticking time bomb of ethnic
violence, the world was shown the image of a yeoman-based nation fending off seemingly foreign
invaders. This was made possible by many of the higher-ups in the Rwandan government owning
a stake in the state radio, Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), making it very easy
to control the information escaping Rwanda.41 Not only did RTLM use its platform as one of the
primary disseminators of radio media in the country, it also violently spoke against the Belgians.
RTLM broadcasted that the Belgians had actively been involved in the assassination of Rwanda’s
President Juvenal Habyarimana and that Belgium ought to leave Rwanda alone completely and
immediately.42 Ironically, the man at the helm of this operation was a Belgian, Georges Ruggiu.
RTLM’s campaign of hatred aimed against the Tutsi as well as the Belgians and UN fueled and
accelerated the progress of the genocide.
The period between 1990 and the beginning of the genocide in April 1994 saw a high
number of weapons sold by foreign nations to the Rwandan government. Some of the most willing
sellers of light arms to Rwanda included post-Soviet Russia and a number of its former Warsaw
Pact allies. Countries like Romania, Slovakia, and especially Russia itself began to sell weapons
to Rwanda to help stabilize the ruble and bring some much-needed balance to their economies and
currency.43 These weapons (largely rifles such as Kalashnikovs) greatly aided in the mobility and
efficiency of the fight against the Tutsi both during the Civil War as well as in the genocide. Further
research and interviews also indicate that the French government also played a large role in
providing arms to Rwanda. A Hutu militia leader that participated in the genocide once admitted
Matthew Lower and Thomas Hauschildt. “The Media as a Tool of War: Propaganda in the
Rwandan Genocide,” Human Rights and Conflict Resolution 2, no. 1 (2014), 3.
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to an interviewer that in the days following Habyarimana’s assassination, France flew in weapons
to Kigali that were then distributed to militia members across the country.44 Of course, this claim
is vehemently denied by the French government, but the supporting evidence for French armament
of the future genocidaires is incontrovertible. Nevertheless, the fact that the French even may have
provided weapons to unknowingly aid in the genocide is frightening. But perhaps the most
surprising seller of weapons to Rwanda eventually rose through the ranks of the UN. Boutros
Boutros-Ghali served as UN Secretary-General during the genocide, but prior to his time at the
UN he was the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Egypt. During his tenure there, he negotiated a 1990
deal that sent “mortar bombs, rocket launchers, grenades, and ammunitions” from Cairo to Kigali
that were proven to be used in the genocide in 1994.45 This fact was not known for several years,
but would eventually come to light after the genocide was over. It is unfortunately very clear that
the weapons provided by these nations would be very important in the genocidal campaign yet to
come.
Reports made by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) and other
UN observers located in Rwanda also should have made it clear that the environment was ripe for
an explosion of ethnic violence. The nature of the Civil War and agreement at Arusha caused
Rwanda to be incredibly unsteady and still poised for ethnic violence. In fact, the plans for
genocide were reportedly being laid while the Civil War was still raging. In a report sent by the
Belgian Ambassador stationed in Rwanda, they warned that “...a secret military staff charged with
the extermination of the Tutsi of Rwanda in order to solve forever…the ethnic problem in Rwanda
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and to destroy the domestic Hutu opposition.”46 This report was sent in March 1992, over two
years prior to the commencement of the genocide, yet little was done to prevent the violence. The
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was also acutely aware of the lack of finality that had
been proposed and planned by the Arusha Accords but had yet to be implemented. In their meeting
on February 17th, 1994, the UNSC claimed that a humanitarian crisis was nearing if the installation
of a new Rwandan government was delayed further than it already had.47 Another report made by
then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in late March 1994 stated that the refusal of
both parties (that being the RPF and the Habyarimana regime) to assist in the installation of a new
government. Boutros-Ghali even mentioned that this hiccup in the plan of UNAMIR had led to a
deterioration of security in Rwanda and acknowledged that it could lead to violence across
Rwanda.48 The refusal of both parties to cooperate in the establishment of a new government
inhibited UNAMIR from fulfilling its mandate. However, the UN made little effort to resolve this
conflict and install the new government.
The most credible and distressing of these warnings has come to be infamously known as
the “Genocide Fax”. In January 1994, UNAMIR Force Commander Roméo Dallaire was put into
contact with a high-ranking official (who used the pseudonym Jean-Pierre) of the interahamwe
militia who provided shocking insight to both the militia as well as the Rwandese Government
Forces (RGF).
Force Commander put in contact with informant by very very important
government politician. Informant is a top level trainer in the cadre of
interhamwe-armed militia of MRND.
Principal aim of Interhamwe in the past was to protect Kigali from RPF.
Since UNAMIR mandate he has been ordered to register all Tutsi in Kigali.
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He suspects it is for their extermination. Example he gave us was that in 20
minutes his personnel could kill up to 1000 Tutsis.
Informant states he disagrees with anti-Tutsi extermination…He also stated
that he believes the President does not have full control over all elements of
his old party/faction.49

There was also more information that the informant revealed not included in this cable.
According to Dallaire, the informant told him that the militia had begun training in techniques of
killing, several large caches of weapons existed across Kigali and Rwanda, and part of the plan of
extermination included the murder of Belgian peacekeepers to provoke their withdrawal. 50 This
report was passed on to the United Nations by Dallaire almost 3 months prior to the assassination
of Juvenal Habyarimana in April. Given the continued violence in the city of Kigali aimed at the
Tutsi and the installation of an ethnically hybrid government, as well as the informant’s highranking status, this cable should have been a chilling warning of what could happen in Rwanda.
Instead, the UN chose to essentially ignore the very dangerous future promised by the informant.
Despite Dallaire’s labeling of the cable as “most immediate”, it reportedly never even crossed the
desk of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali.51 Who Dallaire chose to send the cable to
also should have indicated the urgency of the matter and alerted important members of the UN to
the cable’s importance. According to UN procedure, Dallaire first should have sent the message
to Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, the acting “political civil servant” in Rwanda; instead, his message
was sent directly to Military Advisor Maurice Baril.52 Dallaire, who was well-known to this point
in the UN for being a strict follower of protocol, clearly saw this as credible and viable information
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for the implementation of the Arusha Accords and peace process in Rwanda. Granted, Dallaire did
seem to have natural hesitancy to trust the informant. It was impossible to know if this was merely
a set-up–after all, UNAMIR had certainly not been well-received by extremists in and around the
Rwandan government.53 At the time, the UN decided it was virtually impossible to determine the
veracity of the informant’s information, so little action was taken. While modern scholars have the
benefit of hindsight, the lack of attentiveness paid by the UN to this warning marks a clear failure
in its proclaimed duty to bring peace to Rwanda. Not only that, but the early stages of the genocide
provide an eerie corroboration to Jean-Pierre’s warnings. By then, however, it would be too late
to act upon the informant’s information.
The genocide unofficially commenced on April 6th, 1994. While returning in his airplane
from Tanzania, Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana, Burundian President Cyprien
Ntaryamira, and the rest of the crew on board were killed when the plane was attacked with
surface-to-air missiles while landing in Rwanda’s capital of Kigali.54 This was not necessarily to
the surprise of the international community either. On January 28th, 1994, Habyarimana’s pilot
(who was French) sent a letter noting his fear that the RPF had the capability to attack
Habyarimana’s plane during its landing at Kigali.55 Immediately following the news of
Habyarimana’s assassination, Rwanda was thrown back into a cyclone of ethnic violence. Militias
and members of the Presidential Guard did not hesitate to carry out the plan of genocide, as
prominent Tutsi as well as Hutu who stood in opposition to the violence were ripped from their
homes with their families and brutally tortured and killed.56 While it was certainly perceived in the
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West as such, this was clearly not a mere moment of national unrest. The efficient nature with
which these political opponents (both Tutsi and moderate Hutu alike) were silenced indicates a
clear plan of action that predated Habyarimana’s assassination. Some Hutu extremists (especially
those within the government) even viewed Habyarimana as being too conciliatory with the Tutsi
and used his death as a perfect pretext to launch their genocidal agenda. 57 There was little to no
delay when it came to the commencement of the slaughter. Joyce Leader, an American official in
Rwanda leading a mission investigating the nation, told author Jared Cohen that when she woke
up the next morning, she woke up to the sounds of gunfire and quickly realized this was not simply
a continuation of the Civil War.58 The matter of the timing of the genocide was also worryingly
direct. UNAMIR was scheduled to depart Rwanda on April 5th and the transitional government
was set to come into power on April 8th.59 Moreover, the velocity with which the genocide
commenced reflects an extermination planned prior to the assassination of Habyarimana. An
investigation conducted by the Organization for African Unity (OAU) in the wake of the genocide
estimates that the initial killings in Kigali had killed 20,000 people by April 11th.60 The seemingly
imperfect timing of the genocide seemed to indicate two things: an existing plan to exterminate
the Tutsi as well as a distinct lack of security when it came to communications leaving Rwanda.
Immediately after Habyarimana was assassinated, speculations began to arise about who
may have committed the attack. Belgium’s expert on Rwanda came up with four, reasonable
people and groups that could have possibly committed the attack, and each for different reasons.
His list includes: the inner circle of the Habyarimana regime (akazu), Prime Minister Agathe
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Uwilingiyimana, and the RPF (perhaps with Belgian assistance).61 The fourth theory is somewhat
weak, and is that the target of the attack was actually Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira.
This theory is less likely because his decision to accompany Habyarimana was made at the very
last moment before the plane left Tanzania. The inner circle of Habyarimana is certainly a
fascinating group of potential conspirators, but it is fairly easy to understand why they may have
chosen to assassinate the President. Their goals with assassination would most likely be twofold.
As previously mentioned, Habyarimana faced much opposition from these closest allies for his
leniency and signing of the Arusha Accords, so his death would allow them to go back on
Habyaraimana’s previous agreements. It would also play a vital role in mobilizing the Hutu masses
against the assassinating Tutsi, and begin to carry out their long-planned extermination of them.
Second, Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana certainly stood to gain the most from the death of
Habyarimana. She had the most credible claim to lead the country as Prime Minister after all, and
she could have used the assassination as a sort of coup against Habyarimana.62 This is unlikely for
one very simple fact. Less than 24 hours after the plane crash, Uwilingiyimana herself was found
brutally murdered with her husband by Rwandans seeking shelter at her residence. This was clearly
a targeted, political attack since the compound was not searched, and her children were not
discovered by her assassins either.63 Finally, the RPF had a longstanding opposition to the
Habyarimana regime, and could have been attempting to restart the Civil War in an attempt to take
full control of the government. Samuel Totten points out that this accusation was made largely
without tangible evidence, but it was widely disseminated throughout Rwanda in the initial days
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of the genocide to mobilize Hutu against the Tutsi.64 Because the commencement of the genocide
made it difficult to conduct a thorough and timely investigation, the true culprits of the
assassination remain unknown to this day. A French judge concluded that Paul Kagame and the
RPF were responsible for the attack, but the fallout from that decision has since caused that
decision to be rescinded by the French judicial system in 2018.65 Regardless of whomever fired on
Habyarimana’s plane, Rwanda had reached the point of no return and only foreign intervention
would have slowed what happened in the succeeding months.

The United Nations and the Genocide: Where Bureaucracy Beget Brutality
The initial reaction from the United Nations (first starting on April 6th and lasting for the
next several days) was largely confined to two events: the deaths of Habyarimana and Ntaryimara
and the brutal murders of the Belgian UN peacekeepers. For the first several days of the genocide,
it was very difficult to get reliable news from Rwanda detailing the deterioration of events
following the night of April 6th. The lack of security on the satellite phone used by Dallaire to
reach UN headquarters in New York potentially allowed RGF forces to listen in on these
conversations and stay a step or two ahead of the UN forces stationed in Kigali.66 This led to a
trepidation of sorts, where UN forces in Rwanda believed communicating was an undue risk except
in the most extreme cases. Because of a lack of security with the communications, it made it
incredibly risky for any operational information to be shared through it. Along with the lack of
security on UN communications, Rwandan media controlled by the genocidal government was
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able to slow global response based on the information it was allowing out of Rwanda. RTLM’s
stranglehold on Rwandan press came in very handy for the genocidaires and allowed them to alter
the image of the events unfolding in Rwanda. Because of these factors, it became very difficult to
discern a clear picture of what was happening in Rwanda from the smoky haze which enveloped
it.
A statement made in the immediate aftermath of April 6th’s events by President of the
Security Council, Colin Keating, noted the potential danger and called on all Rwandans “to desist
from any further acts or threats of violence”.67 The global understanding from the outside made it
seem like the early killings were largely limited to knee jerk reactions as a result of entrenched
“tribal mentalities”. And that viewpoint certainly is understandable given that the two sides had
been warring until just a few years prior, and perhaps the entirety of Rwanda’s history. An
Associated Press release reported that the assassination had simply sparked more fighting between
the groups, but also included accounts from Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana about the
horrors gripping Kigali shortly after Habyarimana’s assassination.68 Further reports indicated a
collective uncertainty about the security of Rwanda and who was truly in charge. Another
newspaper report noted that it was unclear who truly had control of Kigali (if there was any
control), and that UN soldiers and politicians had already been massacred. 69 It would take nearly
two weeks for the Western media to piece together an even halfway accurate narrative of what was
happening in Rwanda, leading to a distinct lack of public support for intervention. Further, it would
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not be until after the genocide was over that the world would be able to learn the true extent of the
genocide.
However, it is arguable that the United Nations should have known better than to think the
fighting would simply die out if they called on the sides to put down their arms. During the colonial
period, the Germans and Belgians attempted to display the Hutu-Tutsi divide as an ancient feud.
According to the New York Times, the earliest known “tribal clashes” between the two groups were
as early as the fifteenth century.70 This idea, among other factors, greatly influenced the perception
of the post-assassination violence that had broken out in Rwanda. The UN, whether due to a lack
of information or a belief in the violence being short-term, seemed to think little of the initial
killings. For instance, their meeting on April 7th was called to order at 7:40 PM, and a few
statements were read by Keating; following appeals to the Rwandan people to respect order and
UN forces located in their nation, the meeting promptly adjourned at 7:45 PM.71 To the UN, the
genocide that had erupted in Rwanda was tensions that ought to boil over quickly, and that
UNAMIR on the ground would be able to sufficiently quell the unrest. In the two week period
between the UNSC’s April 7th and 21st meetings, letters flowed in from UN members located in
Africa like Uganda, Cameroon, Tanzania, and a handful from Rwanda itself. While these letters
did maintain that the occurrences in Rwanda were between “warring factions”, the general
consensus among these members was that the UN ought to do something about what was
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happening in the Great Lakes region.72 However, little would be done by the UN once the genocide
commenced.
One of the most impactful moments early on in the genocide (predicted by Dallaire’s
informant Jean-Pierre) was the brutal murder of ten Belgian peacekeepers by RGF forces. The
importance of this attack cannot be understated as this was very clearly a calculated decision made
by the genocidaires. In the Genocide Fax, the very first point of information that Dallaire provides
is the informant’s warning that “Belgian troops were to be provoked and if Belgian soldiers
resorted to force a number of them were to be killed and thus guarantee Belgian withdrawal from
Rwanda.”73 The organizers of the genocide had taken great notice to the reaction of the United
States following the deaths of eighteen Army Rangers in Somalia, and were willing to do the same
in order to remove the Belgian presence from their own nation. On April 7th, ten Belgian
peacekeepers were captured by the RGF and taken prisoner. These soldiers (along with five
Ghanaians) had been charged with guarding the house of Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana, but were
captured by Rwandan soldiers. The Ghanaians were separated once they arrived at the RGF camp,
but the Belgians were left at the hands of a mob of soldiers.74 Left at the hands of an angry military
force who thought the Belgians were involved in the Habyarimana assassination, the ten
peacekeepers were brutally lynched by forces at Camp Kigali. Late on the night of the 7th, Dallaire
arrived expecting to demand the freeing of the Belgian prisoners. Instead, as he notes in his
account, “At first, I saw what seemed to be sacks of potatoes to the right of the morgue door. It
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slowly resolved in my vision into a heap of mangled and bloodied white flesh in tattered Belgian
para-commando uniforms.”75 The fallout was immediate. Global confidence in the peacekeeping
mission in Rwanda had been rocked by the news of the massacre. It was shaken even more when
Belgium announced its plan to withdraw its troop contribution to UNAMIR on April 14th,
reducing the manpower of the mission immensely.76 The brutality in which the soldiers were killed
made many in the West wary about intervening even more, or even made them question what
foreign soldiers could even do to prevent the violence. Most of the media in the West was largely
concerned with calling for the safe removal of its citizens from Rwanda, but largely ignored the
need for a stronger force to prevent the genocide from unfolding further.77 The goal of the massacre
was achieved, as the murder of the Belgian peacekeepers had further weakened an already eroded
public confidence in the mission of UNAMIR.
But at the same time, instructions provided to UNAMIR upon the initial phases of the
genocide greatly handcuffed their ability to intervene in the slaughter. Upon initial contact with
UN brass in New York City following the assassinations, Assistant (Deputy) Secretary-General
Iqbal Riza ordered Dallaire to not militarily intervene unless they were attacked first.78 UNAMIR
was only in Rwanda as a Chapter VI intervention force, so Riza’s instructions make sense given
the relatively minimal, credible information escaping Rwanda at that time. This distinction of
Chapter VI mandate is especially important when considering Rwanda. A Chapter VI mandate is
more focused on maintaining peace, whereas the more aggressive Chapter VII allows for militarily
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enforcing it.79 This meant that while UNAMIR was on the ground in Rwanda, it was only there to
enforce the Arusha peace and implement the new government. They had no actual power to
militarily intervene in the killings, a fact that led to much criticism from the global community. In
the minds of Riza and many other UN members, Rwanda was a powder keg, and any UNAMIR
military intervention would send the wrong signal and undermine its power. Riza’s thinking fell
in line with what the UN was trying to do in Rwanda. From January on, UN headquarters had been
tightening the focus of UNAMIR’s rules of engagement to focus on peacekeeping, even though
the mandate technically gave clearance to protect those in danger.80 The desire of UN headquarters
to keep UNAMIR out of any ethnic conflict restricted UNAMIR’s soldiers on the ground
witnessing the carnage to be limited to bystanders. A story published in The Guardian a few days
after the beginning of the genocide tells of a UN soldier simply commenting, “It’s not our
mandate” as he watched a Rwandan woman dragged by a man wielding a machete.81 UNAMIR
simply did not have the clearance to intervene in the way that they wanted to, nor did they have
the manpower necessary to accomplish much. Dallaire stated in an April 7th interview that because
of their status as a peacekeeping force, “...we did not take on a mandate of unilaterally conducting
security operations or taking on a security responsibility that is still legally in the hands of
governmental agencies.”82 The strict confines of a UN Chapter VI mandate and commitment to
the UN’s bureaucracy meant intervention at an early stage was not an option for the UN forces on
the ground in Rwanda.
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The shortage in numbers for the UN peacekeeping force on the ground also proved to be a
decisive factor in UNAMIR’s inaction. Per the mandate of UNAMIR, the force would consist of
2,500 men on the ground, but that simply would not be enough to substantially intervene,
especially given the narrow rules of engagement.83 Even with the mandate of 2,500 in the force,
the UN had a significant issue in keeping that number fulfilled. To Belgium’s credit, the
peacekeepers on the ground were aware of growing tensions in the early months of 1994. Belgian
representatives protested the UNSC for more troops, more supplies, and more assistance, but the
costs of reinforcing the mission caused the United States and United Kingdom to prevent this
measure from even being voted on.84 Thus, UNAMIR approached the spring of 1994 being
dangerously underequipped and lacking manpower. In March 1994, the UN had 2,206 men
stationed in Rwanda; that number is tripled by the 6,754 peacekeepers deployed in Mozambique
and dwarfed by the 22,289 stationed in the still devastated Somalia.85 On top of a numerically
small force, UNAMIR was full of inexperienced peacekeepers, and at times they would even be
unwilling to fulfill their duties. Dallaire recounts his frustration with the poorly equipped
Bangladeshi soldiers, who would refuse to follow Dallaire’s orders to intervene unless they
received similar orders from the Bangladeshi government.86 Most of the other nations making up
UNAMIR were sent from other militarily underdeveloped countries. This meant that the UN had
to pick up the bill and take the effort to provide desperately needed supplies to its peacekeepers,
something it failed to do throughout the genocide citing the cost of providing those rations. The
lack of supplies provided to UNAMIR’s peacekeepers meant that the peacekeepers had little means
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to offer assistance to desperate Rwandans hiding in UN protected zones like Amahoro Stadium.87
This often led to problems like disease and starvation running rampant in these protected areas,
threatening the lives of both the peacekeepers and the desperate Rwandans seeking shelter too.
What is arguably the most damning decision made by the UN in terms of its response to
Rwanda was its decision to reduce UNAMIR’s force rather than reinforce the mission. On April
21st, the Security Council voted to shift the mandate of UNAMIR. Under normal circumstances,
this language would inspire confidence that the UN was finally taking tangible steps to prevent the
senseless slaughter of Rwanda’s fathers, mothers, and children. Instead, Resolution 912 does the
opposite of reinforcing UNAMIR or taking steps to prevent the slaughter. While declaring that the
UN is “appalled at the ensuing ethnic violence”, and “condemns the ongoing violence in Rwanda”
and “demands an immediate cessation of hostilities”, the UNSC called for a reduction in the force
allocated for UNAMIR.88 After the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Rwandans at that point, the
UNSC was instead choosing to reduce its force on the ground in order to try and save face. The
departure of much of UNAMIR was also the departure of the outside world from the Rwandan
perspective.89 The forces that could have arguably done the most and were on a mission to provide
peace and security to Rwanda were being ordered to leave instead of fulfilling its humanitarian
obligations. That is not to say that the decision to withdraw is completely incomprehensible when
given the context.

The United States and the Genocide: When Somalia Sparked a Stupor
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An important consideration to make when considering the American position is its
involvement in Somalia in years immediately prior to the genocide. The lack of intervention from
the United States specifically is not entirely out of a place of callousness. On October 3rd, 1993
(just two days before the UN Resolution that created UNAMIR), two American helicopters were
shot down over the Somali capital of Mogadishu. Many Americans had seen images of starving
Somali children, and the Somali Civil War had left the African nation shattered beyond belief, and
these images and reports pressured the American populace to clamor for an American
intervention.90 While American (later cooperatively working with the UN) intervention in Somalia
was humanitarian in nature upon initial contact in December 1992, a strong military force was in
place in Somalia. Throughout the intervention of the outside world, a cycle emerged where the
Civil War led to famine which led to further intervention, before coming back to more of the Civil
War.91 During an American mission to capture aides for Mohammed Farah Aideed, an infamous
Somali warlord, two American helicopters were shot down, and an ensuing rescue mission left
nearly seventy wounded and eighteen American soldiers dead.92 Americans had not been involved
in such fierce resistance since the Vietnam War, and the images and reports of the failed mission
shocked many Americans to the core. While support for the American mission in Somalia had
mostly maintained some level of bipartisan support, soon after the Mogadishu firefight many
Republicans in Congress criticized President Bill Clinton for the cost of the mission. The question
on the minds of many Americans was “Why should we intervene in a country that doesn’t want
our help?” and many in Congress agreed that the human and monetary costs exceeded any benefit
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to intervening in Somalia.93 Once the US facade was cracked by the deaths of American soldiers,
there was little benefit to continuing on with the mission. Because the operation in Somalia was
jointly run between the US military and the UN, it provided those within the American government
a perfect scapegoat for the whole disaster. Between politicians in the government itself as well as
members of the mass media, they portrayed America’s participation in Somalia as a coercion of
the United Nations; this point becomes blatantly misleading when the truth emerged that the
operation that led to the death of eighteen American soldiers was carried out solely by American
soldiers that had no contact with the UN.94 The debacle in Somalia was the unfortunate catalyst of
the American public’s disfavor in peacekeeping and dissatisfaction with the United Nations. As a
result of Somalia, anti-UN thought, and inaccurate information escaping Rwanda, public favor of
intervention in Rwanda was relatively low.
The United States had a very active role in Rwanda during the period immediately prior to
the genocide. Since the United States military was simultaneously deployed in Somalia and other
nations across the continent, the American government took a keen interest in the Arusha
negotiations. Sensing the opportunity to broker the peace and solidify their superpower status in a
new, post-Soviet world, the United States pushed itself into the negotiations in Tanzania.95 Here,
they took an active role in pushing the sides into signing some kind of agreement regardless of
how much they agreed upon the terms or whether the implementation of the peace was reasonable.
During the Arusha process, it seemed like the United States had at least some level of
understanding of potential violence between the two groups. One centerpiece of the Arusha
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agreement and process was focused upon upholding and protecting human rights for all Rwandans,
not just those in the ethnic majority.96 The United States also conducted a series of covert missions
to Rwanda in order to assess the danger before and after the warring sides sat down in Tanzania.
In a report dated less than a month before the genocide, the CIA warned a recommencement of
hostilities between the Hutu and Tutsi could lead to the deaths of up to half a million Rwandans.97
However, the United States showed little interest in intervening once the genocide started despite
this grave estimate. It is patently clear that the United States was not ignorant by any stretch when
it came to the possibility for another explosion of violence between the sides.
While the United States eventually voted to support the creation of UNAMIR, that support
was largely considered conditional by American officials. Prior to the proposal of UNAMIR before
the UN, President Bill Clinton indicated that American support for the creation of UNAMIR was
dependent upon both the mandate of it as well as the cost of the forthcoming mission.98 This frugal
attitude towards the funding of a mission necessary for the implementation of the Arusha Accords
is one of the largest faults of the American government in regard to the genocide. Cost estimates
from January 1994 indicate that UNAMIR’s first phase (lasting from October 5th 1993 until April
4th, 1994) would need roughly 47 million dollars in contributions.99 The fact that Clinton and the
rest of the American government found the cost to be concerning is frankly laughable, but is
certainly reflective of the impact of events in Somalia. For reference, the proposed 1994
Department of Defense (DoD) budget included 78 million dollars for “radiation exposure” and a
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grand total of over 308 billion dollars.100 Hypothetically, 1 percent of the 1994 DoD budget could
have funded the initial phase of UNAMIR over 60 times. Rwanda also saw a reaffirmation of the
common idea that it is cheaper to fund peacekeeping than recovery from genocide. Following the
genocide, various nations gave over 600 million dollars to aid in the reconstruction of Rwanda.101
The money pledged in just one meeting in 1996 was over thirteen times the initial funding cost of
UNAMIR in 1993. While America’s frugality can certainly be viewed in the context of the
aftermath in Somalia, the events that unfolded in Rwanda during the genocide largely overshadow
this point.
The initial steps taken by the United States (as well as most other countries with citizens
living in Rwanda) were mainly focused upon withdrawing their citizens from Rwanda. After
hearing reports of the violence breaking out in Kigali and associating it with another outbreak of
the Civil War, the chief concern of the United States in the opening days of the genocide was to
simply evacuate all Americans from Rwanda.102 As noted, evacuating from Kigali Airport was
going to be a herculean task due to its nature as both the site of an assassination investigation as
well as the lack of safety in getting to the airport and in the air. Thus, a very detailed plan was
drawn up to rapidly transport American nationals in military vehicles across Rwanda’s southern
border into Burundi, where they would be met by American air power and safely transported
home.103 Those in the American government touted the mission as a success when no American
casualties were taken by the convoy, but there were lives lost. Most of the Rwandan Foreign
Service Nationals (FSN) were not rescued in the aforementioned convoy; what’s more, 1 out of
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every 3 FSNs were murdered during the genocide.104 These were not Hutu and Tutsi strangers left
behind by the Americans. These were friends and colleagues that were left to fend for themselves
in a whirlwind of violence. This decision was not unique to merely the United States, but it goes
to show that there was a clear, American awareness of the violence’s ferocity very early on in the
genocide.
Furthermore, information circulated in the high circles of Washington demonstrate an
innate understanding of the danger faced by Rwanda in the wake of Habyarimana’s death. It
indicates, however, a viewpoint more concerned about a renewal of the Civil War than a genocidal
campaign against the Tutsi. A document produced early on April 7th by the CIA claimed that the
assassination meant it was likely that the two groups would again take up arms against each other,
and that neighboring Burundi may even fall victim to the chaos as well.105 One of the initial
concerns of the US government was a chaotic outbreak of violence across the Great Lakes region,
but seemed indifferent if the violence largely constrained itself within Rwanda’s borders. Another
declassified document shows that President Clinton was advised that the government was not
willing to involve itself in Rwanda until peace had been fully restored. This statement is further
reinforced by a later prediction that a continuation of violence could lead to “a massive (hundreds
of thousands of deaths) bloodbath” that could also impact Burundi. 106 Despite these and previous
warnings, the Clinton administration showed little interest in providing an intervening American
force in the chaos. Citing both a lack of domestic support for intervention in Africa as well as
Clinton (and many of his top advisors) having little knowledge on Rwanda to begin with, it became
104
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apparent a direct American intervention in Rwanda was not to be expected. 107 In terms of
Washington, there are clear indications that the danger Rwanda faced was clearly apparent yet
ignored by an administration still scarred by Somalia.
While Somalia certainly caused the US to not intervene in Rwanda, Rwanda’s economic
and geographic positions (relative to the US) certainly did it no favors either. Throughout
American history, the American government had shown a greater interest in its neighbors’ affairs
than those elsewhere. Much of the twentieth century bore witness to the United States intervening
in places across the Western hemisphere, but Somalia changed even that. Following the collapse
of the Duvalier regime in Haiti, the United States helped set up a more democratic government,
but pulled out after an insurgency was launched against it. A White House official told Jared Cohen
that the “freshness” of Somalia shook American confidence to continue to involve itself in Haiti,
and the US pulled out shortly after.108 If the United States would not even involve itself in the
affairs of Haiti, a nation with close proximity to the United States, why would it care about a small
nation thousands of miles away? Rwanda was so far off of the radar of the United States that
Secretary of State Warren Christopher supposedly had to use an atlas to find information about
Rwanda.109 This sentiment of non-interventionism as a result of proximity was widely held
throughout the Clinton administration as the genocide went on. It also highlights a point that runs
throughout American foreign policy of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Should
humanitarian concerns for instances of ethnic violence outweigh the (dis)interest of the United
States? A report detailing the feasibility of an international intervention states: “...the fact that
Rwanda is not a direct security concern make it unlikely any significant personnel commitments
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will be made by other European nations.”110 That report is dated to June 1994, and indicates
American interest in the success or failure of the soon deployed Operation Turquoise.
The Ill-Fated and Controversial French Response: Opération Turquoise
The most extensive and incredibly controversial response to the genocide made by the
global community was France’s proposal to fund a humanitarian mission to Rwanda. As the
genocide raged on throughout the end of fall and beginning of winter in Rwanda, it became clear
that something had to be done regarding the killing. Thus, the French proposed a French-led
mission to the UNSC, and their proposal was approved on June 22nd by the council. 111 On the
surface, Turquoise was a humanitarian mission that aimed to bring an end to the killing.
Unfortunately, it was frankly quite clear that French motivations for Turquoise were unclear,
complex and quite possibly malicious. During his first meeting regarding Turquoise, Dallaire
remembered his anger when a French government official told him of their plan to set up a “safe
haven” and be under a Chapter 7 mandate.112 In the mind of Dallaire as well as many historians,
Turquoise was problematic for a number of reasons. First of all, Turquoise pretty easily achieved
a Chapter 7 mandate, whereas Dallaire’s lobbying for an expansion in UNAMIR’s mandate was
done in vain. Questions were also raised regarding the role of the French prior to the genocide and
whether or not their humanitarian mission could be completely without bias. Any involvement by
the French military could be construed as aiding the genocidaires, as the French had previously
been actively involved in aiding the Hutu government prior to the genocide’s outbreak. 113 The
supposed “safe havens” created by the French certainly paint a problematic picture of France’s
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role as well. It became all too common that participants in the genocide would seek shelter in these
safe havens, and other Hutu flocked to these camps to show support for the French intervention
they thought was aimed to push back the RPF.114 The combination of the perceived lack of
objectivity and butting heads with UNAMIR would end up leading to Turquoise miserable failure
to achieve its objectives.
One of the key components of Turquoise’s failure is the relationship of the French
government with Rwanda prior to the genocide. French support of the Habyarimana regime had
been central to the planning of the genocide itself by Hutu extremists inside the Rwandan
government. Furthermore, Rwandan leaders felt a sort of loyalty to the French, as France had been
one of the key donors to Rwanda to aid in the process of democratization.115 This was not a new
French attitude towards Rwanda or the African continent as a whole, even throughout the
preceding decades. Even after the period of African decolonization, France’s connection with
leaders across Africa helped maintain France’s world status while also checking British influence
abroad.116 Here it is observable that the concept of colonialism impacted Rwanda far beyond
independence, as the pseudo-colonialism of the French galvanized extremists into anti-Tutsi
sentiment. French leaders had forged a solid, working relationship with the leaders of Rwanda,
and especially found a solid partnership with the Habyarimana regime. In fact, the OAU report in
the aftermath of the genocide argued that “...Rwanda in the past decade…cannot be understood
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without France.”117 Thus, the French were able to continuously involve themselves in African
politics without a direct paper trail. The early days of the genocide also indicated France’s
complete disinterest in intervening in Rwanda. It seemed that France did anything to convince
themselves that genocide was happening in Rwanda. France, not unlike many European nations
but perhaps more than most, certainly bought into the portrayal of the genocide as more of the
Civil War and continued to lobby this position to other nations as well.118 France’s very public
support of the Habyarimana regime and opposition to the RPF in the years prior to the genocide
decreased Turquoise’s chance of succeeding exponentially.
Furthermore, French military relations with Rwanda were apparent before, during, and
after the genocide. Given their close relations with the Habyarimana regime, French military forces
were not an uncommon sight in Rwanda before the genocide. In fact, these French forces would
play a role in both arming and training some of the militias who would carry out the genocide.119
This training was also carried out in the midst of the Civil War and aimed to benefit the Hutu
defenders in their defense against the “invading” Tutsi. A note presented to French President
François Mitterrand from General Christian Quesnot requested clearance to aid defensive forces
in training and preparation against the RPF in mid-1992.120 Unfortunately (although perhaps
naturally), the French began to sympathize with the Hutu defenders they were training with on the
ground. Whether or not French forces bought into the idea of the RPF as a foreign force is unclear,
but their loyalty to their de facto comrades was understandable. During a meeting of several
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ministers in April 1993, Minister of Defense François Léotard claimed that French forces were
“...facing many thousands from the north” and called for a reinforcement to the French forces in
Rwanda.121 France’s complicity in the arming of the genocide would essentially continue until the
genocide began. Even though it was portrayed as military aid for an ally, it became quite clear
during the genocide that the use of weapons sold by the French was widespread. This provision of
weapons combined with a very supportive French government led those in Rwanda to readily
accept seemingly excessive military supplies.122 There were also several secret communications
between military advisors in Paris and officials in the genocidal government in Kigali after the
genocide had begun. After shipping a number of radio sets to Rwanda, those in Paris were able to
enjoy secret conversations with those in Kigali.123 Even into the 21st century, France sheepishly
ignored the role it played in arming the Habyarimana regime. Along with several other nations
(including Secretary-General Ghali’s Egypt), France has refused to disclose specific details about
weapons transfers to Rwanda.124 This secrecy can certainly be viewed as an admission of guilt of
sorts; regardless, France’s military aid provided under the guise of slowing the RPF invasion has
left an indelible and bloody stain on France’s role in Rwanda.
It can be viewed that the creation of Turquoise undermined what UNAMIR was already
working to achieve on the ground in Rwanda. By the time French troops were on the ground in
Rwanda, UNAMIR had been deployed in Rwanda for around 8 months. After all, UNAMIR’s
mandate had the chief aim to implement a new government and bring peace (or at least as much
as they could) to Rwanda. By deploying a second, separate mission to Rwanda rather than
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reinforcing the existing one, the UN essentially stripped UNAMIR of any authority or ability to
bring order to Rwanda. One of the most infuriating reasons why Turquoise was so controversial
was the relative ease with which supplies were provided. UNAMIR had struggled mightily to
garner supplies from international donors, even as basic as rations or functioning vehicles to
conduct their patrols.125 Had UNAMIR received similar levels of assistance before or even early
into the genocide, they certainly would have been in a better position to save lives. The lack of aid
provided to UNAMIR also provided a slight lift to Turquoise’s public support. Since UNAMIR
seemingly could not do anything to prevent the killing, any international intervention to
supposedly save lives was accepted as a positive step.126 Because of UNAMIR’s existence and
work prior to the arrival of Turquoise, it made it almost impossible for them to coexist.
France’s motivations for proposing a mission to Rwanda have faced well-deserved
scrutiny. The extremely close relations which the countries (and specifically the regime heading
the genocide) made the optics of a “humanitarian” mission poor. Before and throughout the
genocide, the French government ardently opposed the RPF, which made the mission look more
like a military intervention against the RPF rather than a mission aimed at saving lives.127
Turquoise also seemingly furthered the diplomatic ties between France and Rwanda. It was even
welcomed by the genocidal, interim government as reinforcements, rather than a humanitarian
mission aimed at ending the killing.128 Turquoise’s leaders on the ground even took its “neutrality”
from a seeming alliance with the interim government to a declaration of assistance. A French
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colonel deployed with Turquoise announced that they were not there to disarm the RGF, but would
push the RPF back if they entered the Humanitarian Protection Zone (HPZ).129 France’s actions
and words prior and throughout Turquoise’s existence showed the world that its neutrality was
questionable at best and nonexistent at worst.
France’s complicated history and relations with those in the Rwandan government have
left them open to much criticism. A picture created by political cartoonist Carlos Latuff
demonstrates this point delicately. The bottom of the figure displays a sea of skulls labeled
“Rwanda”, while an arm bearing the French tricolor flag draws a machete inserted into the
skulls.130 The portrayal of France’s role in the genocide can range anywhere from ignorant to
complicit to conspiratorial. For nearly thirty years since the genocide, the French government had
maintained overall silence when it came to the genocide. That is until 2021. French President
Emmanuel Macron visited Kigali and gave a speech detailing France’s failures throughout the
genocide, a move that was applauded by Rwandan President Paul Kagame for its candor. 131 This
is a large step when it comes to France coming to terms with its role and position in the genocide.
However, there are more details that must come to light for France’s position to be fully understood
in relation to Rwanda and its genocide.

Is it fair to critique the world’s response to the genocide?
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One of the driving reasons behind the lack of intervention is correlated with the “double
genocide” theory. The “double genocide” angle being pushed by the Rwandan media aimed to
portray the conflict as genocide occurring in both directions (Hutu against Tutsi AND Tutsi against
Hutu), and it was gobbled up by the global community.132 This angle was not necessarily difficult
for the Hutu-controlled media to push; after all, Rwanda had just experienced its bloody Civil War
where the Tutsi could be perceived as an invading force. Most scholars acknowledge that the RPF
engaged in some form of massacres against the Hutu before and throughout the more well-known
genocide against the Tutsi.133 Although the death toll pales in comparison, the evidence does exist.
This viewpoint was also not new to the twenty-first century, trials of the genocidaires, or even a
month into the genocide. As Gerald Caplan points out, violent massacres by the RPF had occurred
prior to 1994 during the Civil War, and became part of the basis of the plan to exterminate the
Tutsi. This thought process was peddled throughout the genocide by RTLM and other propaganda
agencies as a call to arms of the Hutu majority.134 As with much of the data needed to answer many
of the still unanswered questions related to the genocide, empirical research and data is
unfortunately lacking during the early 1990s.135 Regardless of the accuracy of the double-genocide
hypothesis, the mere rumor that it even could be caused the genocide to sometimes be viewed as
a continuation of the Civil War.
However, there is a question among some historians about to what extent foreign
intervention could have helped save lives. Realistically, what could foreign powers have done to
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intervene once the genocide kicked off? It would have taken several weeks to gather forces and
get them to Rwanda. Even then, flying these forces into Rwanda would be next to impossible given
that Kigali Airport was non-operative throughout much of the genocide. By the time
reinforcements (whether they be UN, American, or any sort of conglomerate) arrived on the ground
in Rwanda, the worst of the killing would largely have been over. Given the ferocity with which
the genocide commenced, how much of a chance did the outside world realistically stand when it
came to intervening in Rwanda? According to estimates, the velocity with which the genocide was
occurring peaked on or around April 21st, which was just a day after the UN began weighing
UNAMIR’s future in Security Council meetings.136 With the security of Kigali Airport quite
literally up in the air, fears rose that attempting to fly in reinforcements might cause a repeat of
what happened in Mogadishu.
The genocide would largely end in mid-July when RPF forces led by Paul Kagame
recaptured Kigali from the genocidal Hutu government. Some small pockets of genocide continued
in the countryside, but the killings had largely concluded. A precise death toll has not been
estimated, nor will it likely ever be. The largely-accepted estimation is 800,000-1,000,000 dead,
composed mostly of Tutsi but with some Hutu as well. This breaks down to roughly to a rate of
8,000 deaths per day, 333 deaths per hour, and around 5.5 deaths per minute.137 This rate was
certainly not a constant throughout the entire period of the genocide, but the efficiency of a
genocide carried out in a decentralized manner with a combination of small arms as well as farming
tools is frightening. The end of hostilities in Rwanda brought about a greater ability to understand
what had just happened across the nation. As the information began to piece together into an image
far darker than the world could have imagined, guilt began to arise around the globe. During his
136
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great apology tour to Kigali Airport in 1998, President Bill Clinton gave a speech regarding the
genocide and the failure of the global community to stop the genocide. While arguing it was
partially the result of “tribal violence”, Clinton also acknowledged the global community ought to
bear some of the responsibility as well.138 Clinton’s visit would not venture beyond the airport into
the airport, and his words seemed stale in the ears of Rwandans who had lost many of their family
and friends in the genocide.
Alan Kuperman is a professor of political science at the University of Texas, and one of
his specialties is concerned with humanitarian intervention in ethnic conflict. His book The Limits
of Humanitarian Aid: Genocide in Rwanda comes to the same conclusion mentioned in the
previous paragraph that it would have been next to impossible for foreign intervention in the
genocide to be successful for several reasons. First, Kuperman argues that the expediency of the
genocide meant the international community had almost no time to effectively respond to the
killing. The height of the killing was only two weeks after the assassination of Habyarimana, which
means a humanitarian mission would have arrived too late to save most of the victims. He
concludes that a full-fledged response at the earliest possible time would have at most saved
200,000 of the genocide’s victims.139 This argument is buoyed by Kuperman demonstrating that
the United States did not know a genocide was underway for a couple of weeks. According to him,
the information the United States was receiving was extremely similar to that received by the UN
and the French and the Belgians, and that the earliest genocide could have been confirmed aligned
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with the peak of the killing.140 Kuperman argues in this regard that most of the victims would have
already died by the time the soonest intervention could have been gathered and deployed.
Kuperman’s conclusions raise a number of questions that still cannot be answered today.
First, what drove the United States to intervene in other ethnic conflicts in the 1990s but leave
Rwanda to its destruction? Somalia certainly altered the American view on peacekeeping, but were
there factors beyond that that drove non-interventionism in Rwanda and interventionism
elsewhere? Five years after the genocide in Rwanda, a civil war in Kosovo prompted a massive
humanitarian response from the international community that quickly attempted to restrain the
violence.141 While it would absolutely be a stretch to argue that Kosovo was a carbon copy of
Rwanda, the response to Kosovo compared to Rwanda is striking. NATO’s initial intervention in
Kosovo was hotly controversial, as the legality of its actions was a gray area and many people
considered its intervention illegal.142 Meanwhile in Rwanda, the UN and international community
not only had the ability (perhaps even the obligation) to act, but also the legality to intervene and
chose not to. This is certainly not to cheapen the violence in Kosovo, but instead point to a large
issue of what drives humanitarian intervention. The period of the Cold War saw a large increase
in the interventions of international powers in conflicts around the world, although the 1990s was
certainly fraught with ethnic conflict.143 Secondly, how many deaths would have to be prevented
in order to justify humanitarian intervention? Half? 75 percent? All of them? Again, Somalia
reshaped how Americans viewed intervention and the price they were willing to pay, but the track
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record of the American government in this respect is spotty at best. The Cold War is full of
American intervention around the world with unconvincing justifications. Most famously, the
Vietnam War cost the lives of nearly 60,000 American soldiers (many of whom were drafted
against their will) which is infamous for its controversy among the American people. 144 In
Rwanda, tens of thousands of people were dying every week and the United States seemingly stood
by and watched it happen. The threat of communism spreading through Vietnam prompted a
massive response, but supposed “acts of genocide” warranted little to no action from the
international community.

Conclusions
Never again. The pledge to prevent future genocide was intertwined with the horrors of the
Holocaust. Yet this message was seemingly forgotten for 100 days as Rwandans killed their
neighbors. Regardless of whether or not the international community could have feasibly
intervened in Rwanda, the hesitation and inaction of the world allowed for the deaths of hundreds
of thousands of innocent Rwandans. It is hard and perhaps unfair to group the response of different
nations and entities into one collective critique, so let’s examine a few more groups one more time
and try to make sense of it. UNAMIR was set up to fail in every sense when it came to the Rwandan
Genocide. UNAMIR’s mandate and subsequent withdrawal prevented Dallaire and his troops from
intervening in Kigali’s chaos following Habyarimana’s death. The bumbling and bureaucratic
nature of the UN as an entity prevented it from making an efficient decision aimed at saving lives
and putting an end to the killing. Moreover, the influence wielded by powerful nations like the
United States and France over the UN made it impossible to make progress without the approval
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of those nations. In the case of the United States, the disaster in Somalia and general indifference
to Rwanda as a nation effected almost no response from one of the nations most well-equipped to
intervene in the slaughter. France’s problematic Operation Turquoise seemed to have little effect
on the killing, but was certainly successful at undermining UNAMIR and failing in its role as a
humanitarian mission.
While it is not possible to prevent every case of genocide before it begins, warning signs
certainly existed in Rwanda prior to it. A recent (and to some degree ancient) history of ethnic
violence and a rapid rise in anti-Tutsi rhetoric should have served as a warning that widespread
ethnic violence was certainly possible with the right spark. This historical knowledge combined
with the state of anarchy that took over Kigali and spread to the countryside of Rwanda following
Habyarimana’s assassination should have prompted a stronger reaction from the global
community. It certainly would have been difficult to save a large percentage of the victims, but a
worthwhile attempt at preventing the loss of lives. The Rwandan Genocide is fraught with
oversights and failures, but there are lessons to be learned and extrapolated from it. For one, it
showed how quickly genocide can happen even with foreign entities present. It also increased the
awareness of the global community for ethnic conflict in often overlooked regions of the world.
For the UN specifically, it showed that inaction can be costly and a loyalty to procedure can
sometimes lead to outright failure and the loss of lives. For the US, it perhaps provided the shock
to accept that humanitarian missions are often associated with great risk. For the global
community, it gave an example of how quickly a seemingly peaceful country can turn on itself and
begin its own destruction. All in all, the failure in Rwanda brought into question the commitment
of the UN, US, and larger global community when it comes to preventing cases of genocide when
their tangible benefits in doing so are not visibly apparent.
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